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Abstract
We model an interaction between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver. As
in the classic cheap talk setup, the informed player sends a message to an uninformed
receiver who is to take an action which a¤ects the payo¤s of both players. However, in
our model the sender can communicate only through the use of discrete messages which
are ordered by the cost incurred by the sender. We characterize the resulting equilibria
without rening out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Subsequently, we apply an adapted version of
the no incentive to seperate (NITS) condition to our model. We show that if the sender
and receiver have aligned preferences regarding the action of the receiver then NITS
only admits the equilibrium with the largest possible number of induced actions. When
the preferences between players are not aligned, we show that NITS does not guarantee
uniqueness and we provide an example where an increase in communication costs can
improve communication. As we show, this improvement can occur to such an extent that
the equilibrium outperforms the Goltsman et al. (2009) upper bound for receivers payo¤s
in mediated communication.
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1 Introduction
A person will often use words to convey information about a complex and nuanced reality.
However, the set of possible ideas is much larger than the set of single words which can
be used to express these ideas. One can use words to express more detailed and nuanced
information, but only at a cost to the sender. In this paper, we accommodate these aspects of
communication by taking the view that communication is necessarily costly and discrete. We
analyze the implications of such communication in a strategic interaction between an informed
sender and an uninformed receiver. In our model, the sender learns the state of the world on
the unit interval and transmits a discrete and costly message to the receiver. After observing
the message, the receiver is to take an action which a¤ects the payo¤s of both sender and
receiver.
To gain some intuition, consider the communication between an advisor and an advisee.
The advisor is better informed than the advisee about the quality of the advisees current
research. Additionally, the advisor has better information regarding many other issues related
to the success of the advisee, including the advisees research interests, presentation style,
modes of personal interaction, and so on. Furthermore, the advisor and the advisee have
identical preferences in that both want the advisee to have a successful career.
While the advisor will communicate some relevant information to the advisee, the question
is, why does the advisor not communicate everything which is possibly helpful to the advisee.
The answer, we argue, is that communication is costly and discrete. If there was a single
word to communicate the full extent of the helpful advice then the advisor would transmit this
word. However, there obviously does not exist a single word to communicate the full extent
of the advice. Rather, the advisor can construct more detailed messages, however these come
at a cost to the advisor. As a result, the advisor will not fully communicate even though the
preferences over the advisees career are identical.
We are motivated to investigate costly and discrete communication for both a priori reasons
and for the qualitative insights which the model provides. First, words are scarce and costly
to transmit therefore any model which accounts for this would seem to be a productive step
towards realism. We are also motivated by qualitative insights which the assumptions yield.
Specically, our model provides a very simple explanation for why full communication does
not occur when sender and receiver have perfectly aligned preferences over the action of the
receiver. More generally, our model is possibly helpful in any communication setting in which
the di¤erence in the preferences of the action of the receiver is not the only factor hindering
communication.
In our paper, we rst characterize the equilibrium without rening the out-of-equilibrium
beliefs. We show that without a renement, there is a multiplicity of equilibria. We next
employ an adapted version of the no incentive to separate (NITS) condition of Chen et al.
(2008). This condition roughly states that if the receiver ever observes an out-of-equilibrium
message then the receiver believes that the state is 0. We show that under NITS, if there is
perfect alignment between the preferences regarding the receivers action then the equilibria is
the one most preferred by the receiver: the state space is partitioned into the largest number
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of possible elements. This result is analogous to that of Chen et al. (2008) when NITS is
applied to the original cheap talk model.
If preferences regarding the receivers action are not aligned, we show that NITS does
not guarantee a unique equilibrium and we show that an increase in communication costs can
improve communication. We also show that when preferences are not aligned there exists
an equilibrium in which the receivers payo¤s outperform the Goltsman et al. (2009) upper
bound for payo¤s in e¢ cient, mediated communication.
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the related
literature. In Section 3, we introduce the model and in Section 4, we o¤er some preliminary
analysis. In Section 5, we characterize the equilibrium without renements of the out-of-
equilibrium beliefs. In Section 6, we characterize the equilibrium under NITS where there is
perfect alignment of preferences and in Section 7, we examine NITS in the case of imperfect
alignment. In Section 8, we discuss our modeling choices and in Section 9, we conclude. In the
appendix, we o¤er the proofs which were not presented in the body of the paper. Further, we
present numerical examples involving equilibria without a restriction of the out-of-equilibrium
beliefs and the equilibria as rened by NITS. Finally, we present an example where there
does not exist an equilibrium, even in the absence of communication costs, under an alternate,
and arguably more reasonable, specication of NITS.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Cheap Talk and Related Models
The large strand of cheap talk literature was initiated by Crawford and Sobel (1982) (hereafter
referred to as CS). The authors show that for mild di¤erences in the preferences of receiver
and sender, meaningful, albeit incomplete, communication can occur. CS shows that in each
equilibrium, the state space is partitioned whereby messages induce a unique action within
each element of the partition. Our equilibrium is analogous in that a unique action is induced
on each partition element.
A number of papers have extended the original CS model. For instance, Morgan and
Stocken (2003) extend the CS model to the case where there is uncertainty regarding the
di¤erence between the preferences of the sender and receiver. Fischer and Stocken (2001)
model a situation where the sender has imperfect information about the state. Blume et al.
(2007) modify the CS setup where communication errors (or noise) can occur. In our view,
the present paper shares the goal of these papers: to learn the signicance of a particular
assumption of the CS model. Here we seek to learn the importance of the assumption that
messages are plentiful and equally costless.
This literature suggests an investigation into the conditions under which communication
can be improved over that in the CS model. Blume et al. (2007) demonstrate that a
small amount of noise can improve communication in the CS model. In particular, the
authors show that there is an optimal amount of noise which maximizes the receivers payo¤s.
Subsequently, Goltsman et al. (2009) study general communication in the CS model. The
authors consider mediated communication, whereby a neutral third party (or mediator) will
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o¤er a nonbinding recommendation to both of the players. Goltsman et al. (2009) nd that
the payo¤s in the equilibrium with the optimal amount of noise found by Blume et al. (2007)
is the optimal outcome in any mediated communication in the CS setting. In other words,
the mediator optimally introduces noise to the message of the sender. Within this optimal
mediated outcome, Goltsman et al. (2009) identify an upper bound on the payo¤s which can
be attained by the receiver. Although the settings are di¤erent, we identify an equilibrium
in which communication costs imply that the receiver can attain a payo¤ above this upper
bound. In our view, this illustrates the signicance of communication costs on communication
outcomes.
The original CS model exhibits a large number of possible equilibria. As is often the case
for multiple equilibria, researchers have sought to reduce the number of equilibria through
renements.1 Many standard renements, such as the intuitive criterion and divinity, do not
have the ability to rene the number of equilibria of the CS model. Although there are costly
messages in our model, the standard renements only marginally reduce the set of equilibria
since, among other features, the model is not monotonic in the sense of Cho and Sobel (1990).
A recent innovation in the renement of the equilibria in the CS model is the no incentive
to separate (NITS) condition of Chen et al. (2008). NITS restricts attention to equilibria
in which it is not the case that the sender at the state s = 0 (with a state space of [0; 1])
prefers to perfectly reveal the state. In their Proposition 3, the authors show that if the
monotonicity condition2 holds in the CS model (as it does in the commonly used "uniform-
quadratic" case) then NITS selects a unique equilibrium which contains the largest possible
number of partitions. We present a parallel result: when there are communication costs and
the preferences are aligned, our adapted version of NITS admits only the equilibria with the
largest number of partitions. Despite that NITS yields uniqueness in both of the above
cases, we also show that when preferences are not aligned and there are communication costs,
NITS does not guarantee uniqueness.
2.2 Costly and Constrained Communication
We are not the rst to introduce costly communication into the CS model. Austen-Smith and
Banks (2000) and Kartik (2007) investigate the e¤ect of including both costly and costless
messages in the original CS model.3 These burning money papers ask, what happens if we
include the option of sending costly messages, in addition to the cheap, plentiful messages of
the CS model. By contrast, in our paper the message space is not uncountably innite, but
there are only a nite number of nite-cost messages. The di¤erence between the models can
best be seen in the case of perfect alignment of preferences of the action of the receiver. In
the burning money setup there would be complete communication, whereas in our setup there
1For instance, see Banks and Sobel (1987), Cho and Kreps (1987), Farrell (1993), Kohlberg and Mertens
(1987), Matthews et al. (1991).
2 In the literature, this is commonly refered to as Condition M .
3The cost of these messages are unrelated to the unknown state of the world. See Spence (1973) for the
classic model of the case where the cost of transmitting a signal varies with the underlying state of the world.
Also see Gossner et al. (2006). Kartik et al. (2007) investigate a model of costly lying, credulous receivers,
and show that a separating equilibrium can emerge. Mialon and Mialon (2012) analyze a model where costly
communication can imply nonliteral speech.
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would not be complete communication. Further, the burning money papers nd that the
inclusion of these additional, costly messages can expand the set of equilibria and that there
can be regions of full separation. By contrast, we never nd full separation and, in general,
the presence of communication costs reduce the informativeness of communication.
In Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) the sender incurs costs in order to e¤ectively commu-
nicate information and the receiver incurs costs in absorbing information. In Dewatripont
and Tirole, information is either understood or not.4 By contrast, the states in our model
are better characterized by the degree to which they are understood. Additionally, in De-
watripont and Tirole the sender and receiver necessarily have di¤erent preferences over the
action of the receiver. By contrast, we examine the cases where they are aligned and are
unaligned.5 Lastly, in our model the communication costs are exclusively incurred by the
sender. We focus on this case for the following reasons. When communication is discrete,
it is not obvious how to best model the cost associated with absorbing and processing mes-
sages. Even if a suitable formulation could be found, a higher cost incurred by the receiver
would presumably induce a lower correlation between the state and the action. We suspect
there exists a prole of communication costs borne exclusively by the sender which would
yield an identical distribution of actions as in a model in which both sender and receiver incur
communication costs.
There are other models of costly and constrained communication, with shades of under-
standing.6 In Cremer et al. (2007) a xed number of partition elements are optimally arranged
in order to minimize communication problems between an informed sender and an uninformed
receiver who have identical preferences over the action of the receiver. Like Cremer et al.,
we nd that the equilibrium mapping from the state space to the message space is lumpy in
the sense that the precision with which the receiver learns the state is a¤ected by the details
of the discrete nature of the communication. Also note that in Cremer et al., the size of the
language is exogenously given however in our model the size of the language endogenously
emerges due to the costs of communication.
Finally, Sobel (2012) o¤ers a model of costly communication whereby both sender and
receiver undertake a costly acquisition of communication capacity. In the paper, Sobel also
points out that models of costly communication with aligned preferences can have parallel
results to models of costless communication where preferences are not aligned. In particular,
Sobel notes that for any communication costs or di¤erences in the preferences of the action
taken, full communication is not possible and failure to communicate is always possible. The
author also notes that increases in either communication costs or the di¤erence in preferences
will decrease the quality of communication. The previously mentioned Proposition 3 in Chen
4See Austen-Smith (1994) for another costly communication paper in which information is either understood
or not.
5Also note that we are not the rst to model communication between a sender and receiver who have
identical preferences over the receivers action. See Blume et al. (2007), Blume and Board (2010b), Che and
Kartik (2009), Cremer et al. (2007), Jager et al. (2011), Mialon and Mialon (2012), and Morris (2001).
6Also see Jager et al. (2011) and Mialon and Mialon (2012). In Calvo-Armengol et al. (2011) the sender
transmits a necessarily noisy signal but can a¤ect its precision by a incurring larger communication cost. In
our view, this assumption is less appropriate when modeling discrete communication as it is not obvious to us
how to model noise when messages are discrete.
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et al. (2008) and our Proposition 2 provide another such parallel result between the classes of
models.
3 Model
A sender (S) and receiver (R) play a communication game in a single period. Payo¤s for
both players depend on the receivers action a, as well as the state of the world s. The state
is an element of [0; 1]. The receivers action space is R. The receivers utility is:
uR(a; s) =  (a  s)2:
The receiver has ex-ante beliefs that the state is uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. The
sender observes the state and can communicate some information about the state to R by
sending a message m where m 2 M. Associated with each message mi, there is a cost c(i)
which the sender incurs when it is transmitted. The cost of communication (c : N)R) is
an increasing function of its index.7 Further, we require that c(i + 1)   c(i)   > 0. We
also assume that c(0) = 0. In a slight abuse of notation, we will refer to the case described
above as c > 0, the case where there is no communication costs as c = 0 and the case of both
communication costs and the absence of communication cost as c  0.8 The senders utility
is:
uS(a;mi; s) =  (a  s  b)2   c(i)
where b  0.
The senders strategy is  : [0; 1]! M and the receivers strategy is  :M! R. We
seek an equilibrium (; ) such that S chooses the optimal message, R chooses the optimal
action and Rs beliefs are derived from BayesRule whenever possible. We denote Rs beliefs
as (sjm).
Denition 1 For an equilibrium (; ) we require:
for each s 2 [0; 1], (s) 2 argmax
m0
uS((m0);m0; s)
for each m 2M, (m) 2 argmax
a0
Z
uR(a0; s)(sjm)ds
and that Rs beliefs are derived from Ss strategy using BayesRule whenever possible.
4 Preliminaries
Before we o¤er a characterization of the equilibria, we introduce some notation and provide
a necessary condition for equilibria. Although our equilibria share some of the familiar
characteristics of the cheap talk literature, the additional results which emerge will require the
exibility provided by the notation which we now dene. Like the CS equilibria, messages are
7See Vartiainen (2009) for a related notion of communication costs.
8Of course, since there is no outside option, adding a constant amount to the function c would not a¤ect
our results. We assume that c(0) = 0 in order to render meaningful our notation of c = 0 and c > 0.
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sent on connected, nonoverlapping intervals.9 Therefore, we may characterize an equilibrium
by a set of cuto¤ states. If there are n messages used in equilibrium, we can list the order of
the messages as m1; :::; mn. The messages induce a set of cuto¤ states which we denote:
0 = s1  s2  :::  sh  :::  sn  1 = sn+1:
Equilibrium is such that Ss messages are sent on intervals of the state space:
mh = 
(s) for s 2 [sh; sh+1)
and R best responds in a straightforward manner:
(mh) = a(sh; sh+1) = argmax
a0
Z sh+1
sh
uR(a0; s)(sjmh)ds. (1)
Upon receiving message mh, as in CS, R has posterior beliefs that the message is uniformly
distributed between sh and sh+1. Therefore we can write the best response of R, a(sh; sh+1),
as:
a(sh; sh+1) =
sh + sh+1
2
.
Denition 1 implies the arbitrage equation, which is also found in CS. This expression char-
acterizes the equilibrium set of cuto¤ states:
uS(a(sh; sh+1);mh; s) = u
S(a(sh+1; sh+2);mh+1; s) for h 2 f1; :::; n  1g: (2)
Expression (2) describes the state for which S is indi¤erent between sending message mh
(which is strictly preferred on states (sh; sh+1)) and message mh+1 (which is strictly preferred
on states (sh+1; sh+2)). Now we dene h to be the mass of states such that mh = (s).
Since the messages are sent on an interval of the state space and the states are distributed
uniformly, h = sh+1  sh when mh = (s) for s 2 [sh; sh+1) and mh 6= (s) for s =2 [sh; sh+1).
While subscripts refer to the order of the messages, we use superscripts to denote the cost
index of the message. Therefore, we denote the least costly message as m0, the next costly
message as m1 and so on. Correspondingly, we dene j to be the mass of states associated
with the message which has cost index j. An equilibrium in which there are n actions induced
will obviously require that:
1 + 2 + :::+ n = 1 where h  0 for every h 2 f1; :::; ng. (3)
We now provide a necessary condition for an equilibrium. Lemma 1 describes the relative
size of two adjacent intervals. As in the CS model, for b > 0 the interval size is increasing in
its location on the state space. In other words, for b > 0 and c = 0, the intervals representing
larger numbers on the state space are larger than intervals representing smaller numbers. The
lemma also shows that the size of the interval is decreasing in the cost of the signal transmitted
9See the appendix for the proof of Lemma 6 which shows that the equilibrium strategy for S entails sending
a message for states which are conntected intervals and Lemma 7 which shows that the intervals are not partially
overlapping.
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on that interval.
Lemma 1 For any equilibrium (; ) where b  0 and c  0 in which there are n actions
induced, it must be that:
jh+1
2    ih2 = 4b hjh+1 + ihi+ 4 [c(i)  c(j)] for h 2 f1; :::; n  1g: (4)
It is important to note the generality of expression (4). When b > 0 and c = 0, we are
in the CS model because expression (4) easily reduces to expression (21) in CS. Therefore,
when b > 0 intuition behind the relationship between the interval size and its location on the
state space is identical to that provided by CS. Also note that when c > 0, costly signals
are conserved: the cost of a signal is negatively related to the size of the region of the state
space on which it is transmitted. Finally, note that Lemma 1 and the restriction that each
message has a unique cost, together imply that there are no equilibrium mixed strategies for
the sender. Indeed each sender type has a strict preference to transmit a single message, with
the exception of the boundary types.
5 Equilibrium Characterization
In this section we characterize the equilibrium without rening the out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
Our rst result is that, in equilibrium, the least costly message is always used. Further, for
any positive communication costs there will exist an uninformative equilibrium where the least
costly message is sent on all states.
Lemma 2 In any equilibrium (; ) where c > 0 it must be that (s) = m0 on some
states. Also for c > 0, there will exist an equilibrium (; ) such that (s) = m0 on all
states.
Proof: Consider an equilibrium (; ) in which the least costly message m0 is not sent
on any region of the state space. For any out-of-equilibrium beliefs of the receiver, we will show
that there exists a protable deviation. Suppose that upon observing an out-of-equilibrium
message, the receiver believes that the message was transmitted by a sender of type es, which
would induce action es. If es   b  0 then the sender type es   b could deviate and send the
message m0. This deviation message would induce the preferred action of this sender type
and could be sent with a smaller cost than the equilibrium message. If es   b < 0 then the
sender type 0 could deviate and send message m0. This deviation would induce the preferred
action of the sender type restricted to [0; 1], which is 0. Further m0 could be transmitted at
a smaller cost than the equilibrium message. In either case, there is a protable deviation
for S, and so (; ) cannot be an equilibrium. Now consider strategy pair (; ) such that
(s) = m0 for all s 2 [0; 1]. Suppose that an out-of-equilibrium message implies that the
receiver believes that it was sent by the sender type 0:5. As a result, an out-of-equilibrium
message does not induce an action which is not induced in equilibrium. Therefore, there
is no protable deviation from this completely uninformative strategy pair and so it is an
equilibrium.
We note that there are many other out-of-equilibrium beliefs which, for some parameter
values, support the uninformative equilibrium of Lemma 2. However, the beliefs specied in
the proof of the lemma support the uninformative equilibrium for all parameter values.
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Next, we o¤er a denition which summarizes the necessary conditions for an equilibrium
without renement of out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
Denition 2 A strategy pair (; ) is feasible if it satises expressions (1), (3), (4) and
additionally the least costly message m0 is sent on some region of the state space.
We are ready to characterize the equilibria without rening out-of-equilibrium beliefs. As
the following proposition shows, each feasible strategy pair (; ) will form an equilibrium.
Proposition 1 If (; ) is feasible then it is possible to nd out-of-equilibrium beliefs such
that the strategies form an equilibrium (; ).
As the above proposition implies, there are many equilibria when the out-of-equilibrium
beliefs are not rened. This abundance of equilibria stands in contrast to our results in the
following section. There we show that for b = 0, the only equilibria which satisfy our version
of NITS are the equilibria which have the largest possible number of partitions. Note that
Example 3, given in the appendix, illustrates the multiplicity of equilibria when we do not
rene out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
6 Alignment of Preferences under NITS
Here we focus on the implications of our adaptation of the no incentive to separate (NITS)
condition for case where the preferences regarding the receivers actions are perfectly aligned
(b = 0). We begin by noting that when b = 0, the arrangement of the signals across the state
space does not matter. To see this, we can rewrite expression (4) in Lemma 1 for the case of
b = 0 as:
(j)2   (i)2 = 4 [c(i)  c(j)] : (5)
As expression (5) suggests, the interval size on which a message is sent is exclusively
determined by its communication cost and not by its location on the state space. As a result,
expression (5) does not contain subscripts.
If the incentives are aligned (b = 0) and there are n actions induced in equilibrium then
there are n+1 sender types which have the largest di¤erence between the equilibrium payo¤s
and the payo¤s which could be achieved if the sender type was identied by the receiver.
In other words, we say that these n + 1 sender types have the most incentive to deviate.10
Therefore, as a matter of convention, we select one of these n + 1 states. Hence, NITS
species that if an out-of-equilibrium message is observed then R believes that the state is
certain to be s = 0.
No incentive to separate: Given a strategy pair (; ), if R observes em where em =2
([0; 1]) then R believes that the state is certain to be s = 0, (0jem) = 1.
Note that our version of NITS is not identical to the original specication of Chen et
al. (2008). Our specication focuses on the out-of-equilibrium beliefs which are implicit
in the original specication. The authors motivate their condition by suggesting that, upon
10See Lemma 8 in the appendix.
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observing an out-of-equilibrium message, a natural place to expect such a deviation is from the
lowest state.11 Before the statement of NITS, we noted that if b = 0 and there are n actions
induced in equilibrium then there are n+ 1 states in which the sender has the most incentive
to deviate, should an out-of-equilibrium message lead the receiver to correctly identify the
sender type. All of the results involving b = 0 would follow if we selected any of the other
such n states.12
Before we state the main result regarding the equilibria under NITS, we provide the
following lemmas which are used in the proof of the result. Our next lemma shows that,
if a message of a certain cost is used in equilibrium, it must be the case that all lower cost
messages are also used in equilibrium. We refer to this as the no holes result.
Lemma 3 Consider an equilibrium (; ) in which mi is transmitted. Under NITS, if
b = 0 then every mj where c(j) < c(i) is also used in equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose that there is an equilibrium (; ) such that (s) = mi with cost c(i)
however there does not exist an s0 such that (s0) = mj and c(j) < c(i). If the signal mj is
observed, R believes that the state is certain to be s = 0. On the interval in the state space
for which the S sends message mi, Ss payo¤ cannot be greater than  c(i). By Lemma 8, S
has identical payo¤s at each of the states for which expression (5) is satised, including the
states 0 and 1. Therefore, at s = 0, the sender has a payo¤ of less than  c(i) and a protable
deviation is then to send mj . Therefore, (; ) cannot constitute an equilibrium.
We compare Lemma 2 with Lemma 3. Unlike the case where there are no renements of
the out-of-equilibrium beliefs, we are guaranteed to not have holes in the equilibrium under
NITS. For this reason, we amend the denition of feasibility to account for the no holes
result.
Denition 3 A strategy pair (; ) is NITS-feasible if it satises expressions (1), (3), (4)
and additionally there does not exist a used message mi and an unused message mj such that
c(j) < c(i).
We now show that we are guaranteed a NITS-feasible strategy pair with a most costly
message mk such that there does not exist a NITS-feasible strategy pair with a most costly
message mk
0
where k0 > k. If such a k is found then we say that the NITS-feasible strategy
pair with a most costly message mk is maximal. In the lemma below, we show that if
preferences are aligned then there is a NITS-feasible strategy pair (; ) which is maximal.
Lemma 4 If b = 0 then for any c > 0 there always exists a maximal, NITS-feasible strategy
pair (; ).
Proof: In order to identify the maximal, NITS-feasible strategy pair, we start with the
strategy pair involving messages m0 and m1. We check whether this is NITS-feasible. If it
11The reader should consult Chen et al. (2008) for further justication of the NITS condition.
12However when b > 0 the specication of NITS indeed a¤ects the results. As we show in the appendix,
if b > 0 then we are not guaranteed existence for an alternate, and arguably more reasonable, specication of
NITS.
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is not then the uninformative strategy pair is the maximal, NITS-feasible strategy pair. If
it is NITS-feasible then we check whether the strategy pair involving messages m0, m1 and
m2 is NITS-feasible. If it is not then the strategy pair involving messages m0 and m1 is
the maximal, NITS-feasible strategy pair. If it is NITS-feasible then we check whether the
strategy pair involving messages m0, m1, m2 and m3 is NITS-feasible. We continue until we
arrive at a k0 such that the strategy pair involving messages m0, ..., mk0 is not NITS-feasible.
To check whether a particular strategy pair (; ) is NITS-feasible, we rewrite expressions
(3) and (4). Consider the case where mk is the most costly message used. The message which
costs c(k) is sent on an interval of size k. The message which costs c(k   1) is sent on an
interval of size k 1 =
q
4 [c(k)  c(k   1)] + (k)2. The message which costs c(k  2) is sent
on an interval of size k 2 =
q
4 [c(k)  c(k   2)] + (k)2. The message which costs c(2) is
sent on an interval of 2 =
q
4 [c(k)  c(2)] + (k)2. The message which costs c(1) is sent on
an interval of size 1 =
q
4 [c(k)  c(1)] + (k)2. Finally for the costless message, we write
0 =
q
4c(k) + (k)2. Therefore, when mk is the most costly message sent, we may write
expression (3) as:q
4c(k) + (k)2 +
q
4 [c(k)  c(1)] + (k)2 +
q
4 [c(k)  c(2)] + (k)2+ (6)
:::+
q
4 [c(k)  c(k   2)] + (k)2 +
q
4 [c(k)  c(k   1)] + (k)2 + k = 1:
If k  0 then the strategy pair is NITS-feasible. However, for k < 0 the strategy
pair is not NITS-feasible. To see that we will eventually reach a strategy pair which is
not NITS-feasible, recall that we require that c(i + 1)   c(i)   > 0 for all i 2 f0; :::; kg.
Therefore, we can write the lower bound of each term in the left hand side of expression (6):p
4k +
p
4(k   1) +
p
4(k   2) + :::+
p
4(2) +
p
4 > 1. (7)
For every  , there is a k large enough so that expression (7) is satised. Therefore, we are
guaranteed a maximal, NITS-feasible (; ).
Intuitively, Lemma 4 shows that, for any communication costs when there are aligned
preferences, there exists an upper bound on the number of messages used in an equilibrium.13
It should not come as a surprise that full communication is not NITS-feasible when c >
0. However, the straightforward characterization of equilibrium under NITS is perhaps
surprising, given the complicated nature of characterizing the equilibria without rening out-
of-equilibrium beliefs.
We are now ready for the main result of the section. Proposition 2 shows that we are
guaranteed an equilibrium under NITS. Further, the only equilibria admitted under NITS
are the ones which are maximal among the NITS-feasible strategy pairs.
Proposition 2 If b = 0 then under NITS an equilibrium (; ) exists and it is a member
of the maximal, NITS-feasible class.
13Note that a variant of Lemma 4 would hold for the case of b > 0. However, it is not necessary for our
present purposes and it would require a slightly di¤erent proof, therefore we do not provide it.
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Proposition 2 shows that under NITS, only the strategy pairs with the largest possible
number of messages will not have a protable deviation. The proposition uses the language
class because when b = 0, the ordering of the messages does not matter. Also, one can see
the full force of NITS by noting the di¤erence between the multiplicity of equilibria without
rening the out-of-equilibrium beliefs and the uniqueness in Proposition 2.
Despite the very di¤erent settings in which they occur, our Proposition 2 is parallel to
Proposition 3 in Chen et al. (2008). The authors show that in the CS model where monotonic-
ity holds, NITS admits only the equilibrium with the largest possible number of actions in-
duced. In the notation of our model, Chen et al. (2008) show that for b > 0 and c = 0 in
the uniform-quadratic case, NITS uniquely selects the equilibrium with the most partitions.
Our Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 of Chen et al. (2008) become more surprising when we
provide an example which demonstrates that we are not guaranteed uniqueness when b > 0
and c > 0.
6.1 Simple Characterization
Here we focus on the case where preferences are perfectly aligned (b = 0) and communication
costs are linear in the index of the message. In other words, we assume that c(k) = ck where
c > 0. One benet of this exercise is that, for general communication costs it is di¢ cult to
characterize the threshold level of costs which render a strategy pair (; ) NITS-feasible.
However, in the linear case the characterization is simple. If c  c(k) then a strategy pair
(; ) which employs a most costly message mk is NITS-feasible and if c > c(k) then such
a (; ) is not NITS-feasible.
Lemma 5 If c(k) = ck and c > 0 then the cuto¤ cost for a strategy pair involving message
mk is:
c(k) =
 
1
2
Pk
j=1
p
j
!2
:
Proof: At the largest c such that the strategy pair involving messagemk isNITS-feasible,
it must be that
 
k
2
= 0. By expression (5) it must be that,
 
k 1
2
= 4c,
 
k 2
2
= 8c, ..., 
1
2
= 4(k   1)c,  02 = 4kc. Therefore, we may write expression (6) in the case of linear
costs as
2
p
c(k) + 2
p
c(k   1) + 2
p
c(k   2) + :::+ 2
p
c(2) + 2
p
c(1) = 1:
and so the lemma is proved.
See Example 4 in appendix for an application of Lemma 5. There we show how the
calculation of c reduces the di¢ culty in identifying the maximal, NITS-feasible equilibria.
Example 4, when compared with Example 3, also illustrates the utility of NITS in reducing
the number of equilibria.
7 Imperfect Alignment of Preferences under NITS
Recall Proposition 2 which demonstrated that the only equilibria admitted under NITS are
maximal and NITS-feasible. In a parallel fashion, Proposition 3 in Chen et al. (2008) shows
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that in the CS model where monotonicity holds, NITS admits only the equilibrium with
the largest possible number of partitions. In the notation of our model, Chen et al. (2008)
show that for b > 0 and c = 0 in the uniform-quadratic case that NITS uniquely selects the
equilibrium with the largest number of induced actions. However, as we show below, when
b > 0 and c > 0 we are not guaranteed uniqueness.
Recall that for the case of b = 0 and c > 0, the order of the messages does not matter as
long as their size is governed by expression (5). For the case of b > 0 and c = 0, the order
of the signals themselves does not matter, but it does matter that the size of the intervals
are increasing along the state space. However, when b > 0 and c > 0 there is an interaction
between these two e¤ects, which might cause the nonuniqueness which we now describe.
The nonuniqueness can manifest itself in two distinct ways. First, there could exist several
equilibria with an identical set of equilibrium messages, however these equilibria di¤er in their
informativeness, as measured by the ex-ante payo¤s of the receiver. Second, there can exist
equilibria which di¤er in the set of equilibrium messages. The following example demonstrates
this second aspect and the subsequent example demonstrates the rst.
Example 1 Suppose that b = 0:245 and communication costs are c(i) = 0:01i. First,
there exists an equilibrium (; ) where two messages are used. Message m0 is sent on
s 2 [0; 0:03) and the m1 is sent on s 2 [0:03; 1]. The senders s = 0 equilibrium payo¤s are
 (0:015  0:245)2 =  0:0529, which is greater than the deviation payo¤s of  (0:245)2   0:02
=  0:080. There also exists an equilibrium where m0 is sent for all states. The senders
s = 0 equilibrium payo¤s are  (0:5   0:245)2 =  0:065, which is greater than the deviation
payo¤s of  (0:245)2   0:01 =  0:070.
The example above shows that when b > 0 there can exist equilibria with a di¤erent set of
messages. Our next example shows that when b > 0, there exist equilibria with identical sets
of messages yet di¤er in their informativeness. Also note that the following example shows
that when b > 0 there exists equilibria where an increase in communication costs will improve
communication.
Example 2 First, consider the costless communication case. When b = 0:2, and c(i) = 0,
all equilibria are outcome equivalent to the following: a single action is induced on s 2 [0; 0:1)
and a single action is induced on s 2 [0:1; 1]. Message m0 induces a = 0:05 and message
m1 induces a = 0:55. In this case, E[ (a   s)2] =  0:0608. However, when b = 0:2, and
c(i) = 0:01i, there are two non-outcome equivalent equilibria. In the rst equilibrium, m0
is sent on s 2 [0; 0:12) and m1 on s 2 [0:12; 1]. In the second equilibrium, m1 is sent on
s 2 [0; 0:08) and m0 on s 2 [0:08; 1]. In the rst equilibrium, E[ (a  s)2] =  0:0569 and in
the second, E[ (a  s)2] =  0:0649. If the cost of communication is increased to c(i) = 0:02i
then in the rst equilibrium m0 is sent on s 2 [0; 0:14) and m1 on s 2 [0:14; 1], implying
E[ (a  s)2] =  0:0532.
Example 2 illustrates a setting in which an increase in communication costs can lead to
an improvement in communication. Also note that Example 2 contained an instance of two
distinct equilibria, which share the set of equilibrium messages yet di¤er in their informative-
ness.
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Recall that Goltsman et al. (2009) study the optimal mediated communication equilibria.
The authors nd that the upper bound for the expected payo¤s of the receiver in mediated
communication is:
E[ (a  s)2] =  1
3
b(1  b):
In Example 2, this upper bound would be  0:0533. However we note that the last equilibrium
described in Example 2 outperforms this upper bound.14 Keep in mind that these results
occur in very di¤erent settings. In the Goltsman et al. setting, a mediator is adding an
optimal amount of noise to the message of the receiver. In our setting, communication occurs
through messages which have a di¤erential cost.
While the settings are very di¤erent, it is interesting to note that communication costs
can have as positive an inuence on communication as that produced by the optimal amount
of noise. What is the intuition behind our equilibrium which outperforms the Goltsman
et al. (2009) upper bound? Note that there are two e¤ects at work. When b > 0, the
sender increases the size of the intervals at the upper end of the state space, which reduces
the expected payo¤ to the receiver. However, the communication costs induce the sender to
decrease the interval sizes on which the costly signal is sent. In the relevant equilibrium, the
costly message is transmitted on the upper end of the state space. Therefore, these e¤ects
work in opposite directions, thereby achieving an expected payo¤ above that of the upper
bound for the case where communication is not costly.
Also, note that the e¤ects discussed above are very di¤erent from the e¤ects found in the
burning money literature. Unlike the burning money literature, it is not the case that there is
a larger number of actions induced in equilibrium. Rather, the improvement is due to the fact
that the partitions on the state space are more evenly spaced as a result of the communication
costs.
8 Discussion of Modeling Choices
Before we proceed to the conclusion, we discuss some of our modeling choices. Our state
space is designed to be richer than our message space15 as the state space is uncountably
innite and there are only a nite number of messages which can be transmitted with a
nite cost. We believe that this captures an important aspect of reality: it is impossible to
completely communicate the complexity of the real world, one may only increase the precision
of communication by expending more costly e¤ort. Also note that the size of the language
used in equilibrium arises endogenously. In our view, this captures another important feature
of reality: the precision of communication is determined by the costs incurred by the sender.
We assumed that there is only a single message associated with a particular communication
cost. This assumption yields several benets. First, there is no need to restrict attention to
pure strategies. In the case where there are several messages of a particular cost, obviously
the receiver would not employ mixed strategies in equilibrium, however this is not the case
14This possibility was rst suggested by Andreas Blume.
15This assumption also appears in Jager et al. (2011) and Lipman (2009). Blume and Board (2010a)
examine the opposite case where the message space is much larger than the state space.
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for the sender. In this case, there exists equilibria in which the sender would use mixed
strategies, and NITS would not exclusively admit the equilibrium with the most partitions.
Further, even when restricting attention to pure strategies, Proposition 2 would not hold, as
we would need an additional restriction to guarantee the selection of the equilibrium with the
most partitions.
Perhaps a natural questions is, why not model communication which is necessarily noisy
where the sender incurs a communication cost which is decreasing in the variance of the pos-
sible messages. Within this possibility, there arise some features which we nd unappealing.
First, as Blume et al. (2007) showed, the quality of communication is not monotonic in
the amount of noise and also communication is always enhanced by a small amount of noise.
Therefore in any model in which the sender can a¤ect the amount of noise, there will be
parameters such that the sender would prefer more noise to less noise. Further, this problem
is not avoided if the noise is determined by the amount of e¤ort expended by the sender.
Therefore, we do not view this possibility as an adequate substitute for our modeling choices.
Second, it is important that the model does not allow back-door communication between
sophisticated players. Suppose that the sender would specify the upper and lower bound of
the possible states and incur a cost which is decreasing in the size of this interval. In this
case, we would have to assume that the receiver is unsophisticated, otherwise the sender would
transmit the largest possible interval with the desired state at one endpoint. For instance, if
the sender wished to communicate the state, s = 0:315789215, the sender could cheaply send
the message leading to the possible interval [0:315789215; 1] and the sophisticated receiver
would infer that the state is certain to be 0:315789215. To avoid these types of problems, we
would either have to model the receiver as unsophisticated or to model communication as we
do here.
In both of the above options, the communication does not, in our view, resemble commu-
nication which is costly and discrete. Most notably the resulting equilibrium would be a fully
separating equilibrium whereby each state would induce a unique action by the sender. By
contrast, the equilibrium in our model is a pooling equilibrium in that several states induce
identical actions by the sender. This seems to be more consistent with our intuition regarding
communication.
We have worked to justify our modeling choices, but at this point it is also natural to
wonder about the individual contributions of the assumption of costly communication and
that of discrete communication. In other words, we now discuss the individual implications
of both of these assumptions. First, consider the case where communication is costly but there
are an innite number of messages which are not discrete. In this setting, there would be a
message with a cost between the costs of any two messages. Under these assumptions, there
would not exist an equilibrium in which more than one message is transmitted, since for any
message greater than the least costly message, there would always exist a less costly message.
Therefore, the assumption of costly communication, without a restriction to a discrete set will
not lead to satisfactory model of communication.
Second, consider the case where messages are costless but there are a nite number of
discrete messages. For the case that b = 0, we would see that every message is transmitted so
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that the number of messages in the message space would be a binding constraint. Therefore,
this model does not produce an interesting and nontrivial result. Now consider the case
there where we take the limit of the equilibrium where we allow the number of possible
messages to go to innity. For the case that b = 0, based on the results of Spector (2000),
we suspect that the equilibrium would converge to that of full communication. Hence, in
neither the nite nor the innite message case does the assumption of costless and discrete
messages produce a satisfactory model. Therefore, the assumptions of costly communication
and discrete communication are both necessary because only together do they imply a model
with interesting and nontrivial results.
9 Conclusions
We have modeled an interaction between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver where
communication is costly and discrete. We have characterized the equilibria without rening
out-of-equilibrium beliefs. When the sender and receiver have aligned preferences over the
action of the receiver, we have demonstrated that the no incentive to separate (NITS) out-of-
equilibrium condition admits only the class of equilibria with the largest possible number of
actions induced. This result is parallel to the application of NITS to the uniform-quadratic
version of Crawford and Sobel (1982). Finally, for the case that preferences are not aligned, we
note that NITS does not identify a unique equilibrium and that an increase in communication
costs might improve communication. Further, we show that this improvement can be large
enough so that it outperforms the Goltsman et al. (2009) upper bound of the receivers payo¤s
in e¢ cient, mediated communication.
There remain interesting questions which are unanswered. For instance, although we
suspect that we are guaranteed an equilibrium under NITS when b > 0, we have been unable
to nd a proof. Also, we have modeled the interaction as a single repetition. However, we
are interested to learn the equilibrium behavior where the interaction is repeated. There are
three possibilities as the relationship is potentially nitely repeated, innitely repeated or is
repeated until the communication attains some threshold. There exists an additional issue,
which arises only in the repeated version of the game: presumably there is a relationship
between some publicly observable signal and the optimal action for the receiver and also
that the sender wishes to teach the receiver this relationship. It would seem interesting to
explore this learning. Additionally, we are eager to learn the signicance of our assumption
of quadratic preferences and a uniform probability distribution. Finally, we are interested to
know whether an environment with several heterogenous senders and receivers, would produce
a novel matching problem.
Finally, Du¤y et al. (2011) tests our model in an experimental setting. Like most commu-
nication games, our equilibrium is complicated and this fact makes experimental investigation
di¢ cult. However, using the example of other such papers16 the authors test a simplied
version of the theoretical model presented above. Du¤y et al. (2011) nd that the size of
the language arises endogenously, as it does in our paper. This suggests that further study
of costly and discrete communication could prove fruitful.
16For instance, Cai and Wang (2006) and Kawagoe and Takizawa (2009). Also see Blume et al. (1998) and
Blume et al. (2001).
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10 Appendix
The appendix is organized as follows. In 10:1, we rst prove a few results about the nature of
the equilibria. Then we prove the results which appear in the body of the paper. Subsequently
in 10:2, we o¤er two numerical examples which illustrate the equilibria without renement
of out-of-equilibrium beliefs and that under NITS. Finally in 10:3, we o¤er an example
where there does not exist an equilibrium for an alternate, and arguably more reasonable,
specication of NITS.
10.1 Proofs
We now o¤er Lemma 6, which shows that the intervals must be connected and Lemma 7,
which shows that the intervals cannot partially overlap.
Lemma 6 In any equilibria it cannot be the case that there exists m such that m 2 (s) =
(s), m0 =2 (s) = (s), m0 2 (s0) and m =2 (s0) where s < s0 < s.
Proof : Suppose there exists m such that m 2 (s) = (s), m0 =2 (s) = (s),
m0 2 (s0) and m =2 (s0) where s < s0 < s.
If (m) = (m0) then there exists a protable deviation for S in choosing the cheaper
message. Now suppose that (m) 6= (m0). If (m) < (m0) and m0 2 (s0) as:
 ((m)  s0   b)2   c(m) <  ((m0)  s0   b)2   c(m0)
then it must be that:
 ((m)  s  b)2   c(m) <  ((m0)  s  b)2   c(m0).
We have arrived at a contradiction because there is a protable deviation to m0 on s.
If (m) < (m0) and m 2 (s) as:
 ((m)  s  b)2   c(m) >  ((m0)  s  b)2   c(m0)
then if must be that:
 ((m)  s0   b)2   c(m) >  ((m0)  s0   b)2   c(m0).
We have arrived at a contradiction because there is a protable deviation to m on s0. The
proof for the case of (m) > (m0) follows in the analogous manner.
Lemma 7 In any equilibria it cannot be the case that m0 2 (s0) where s0 2 [s1; s3) and
m00 2 (s00) where s00 2 [s2; s4) where s2 < s3.
Proof : Suppose that there was such an equilibrium. The message m0 induces action a0
and message m00 induced action a00. Therefore the payo¤ from sending m0 is
US(m0) =  (a0   s  b)2   c(m0)
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and the payo¤ from sending message m00 is
US(m00) =  (a00   s  b)2   c(m00):
For a0 6= a00 there is only a single state for which
US(m0) = US(m00)
and therefore it cannot both a0 and a00 are sent on [s2; s3). For the case of a0 = a00 it must be
that s2 < s1 < s3 < s4. Then there exists a protable deviation by the sender to select the
cheaper message. Therefore there cannot exist such an equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 1: If there are n + 1 distinct actions induced by the sender then it
must be that there are n equations in expression (2). If this was not the case then Denition
1 would not hold. A typical such expression would be the cuto¤ state between intervals such
that mih 2 (s0) for s0 2 [sh; sh+1), mjh+1 2 (s00) for s00 2 [sh+1; sh+2):
 

sh + sh+1
2
  sh+1   b
2
  c(i) =  

sh+1 + sh+2
2
  sh+1   b
2
  c(j):
Which we rewrite as:
 

sh   sh+1
2
  b
2
  c(i) =  

sh+2   sh+1
2
  b
2
  c(j)
 
 ih
2
  b
2
=  
 
jh+1
2
  b
!2
+ c(i)  c(j)
so that
(jh+1)
2   (ih)2 = 4 [c(i)  c(j)] + 4b

ih + 
j
h+1

:
Lemma 6 showed that the intervals must be connected. Lemma 7 showed that the equi-
libria cannot be partially overlapping. Lemma 1 showed the relative size of the intervals as a
function of their position on the state space and the cost of message. Also note that Lemma
1 together with the assumption that a unique cost is associated with each message implies
that the sender will not employ a mixed strategy.
Proof of Proposition 1: Suppose that strategy pair (; ) is feasible, and therefore
message m0 is transmitted on some portion of the state space. In particular suppose that
(s) = m0 for s 2 [s; s). Suppose that upon observing an out-of-equilibrium message, the
receiver believes that the message was transmitted by a sender of type s+s2 . As a result,
an out-of-equilibrium message does not induce an action which is not induced in equilibrium.
Given , there does not exist a protable deviation from  regarding the messages used in
equilibrium since it satises expression (4). There does not exist a protable deviation for
S by sending an out-of-equilibrium message. Given  which satises Lemma 1 there is no
protable deviation for R from  since it satises expression (1). Therefore, the strategy pair
(; ) is an equilibrium.
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Lemma 8 Consider an equilibrium (; ). If b = 0 and there are n actions induced then
there are n+ 1 solutions to mins2[0;1]US((m); (s); s).
Proof: Suppose that US(a; bm; s) > US(a; bm; s) where ([s; s)) = bm. As the distribution
is uniform, a(s; s) = s+s2 . This implies that

s+s
2   s
2
>

s+s
2   s
2
, which cannot be the
case. Combined with expression (2), we have n+ 1 such solutions.
Hence, if b = 0 and there are n actions induced there are n + 1 states with the worst
ex-post payo¤. Naturally these are candidates for reasonable beliefs in the event of an out-
of-equilibrium message. Further, any of these n+ 1 states would be su¢ cient for the results
under NITS to hold when b = 0.
Proof Proposition 2: First we show that an equilibrium underNITS exists. As Lemma
4 shows, there will always be a maximal, NITS-feasible strategy pair (; ). Suppose that
mk where k 2 N is the most costly message in this maximal, NITS-feasible strategy pair
(; ). In other words, there is a solution to: 
j
2    i2 = 4(c(i)  c(j)) for i; j 2 f0; ::; kg
i  0 for i 2 f0; ::; kg
0 + 1 + :::+ k = 1
which we can rewrite as:
0 +
q 
0
2   4c(1) + :::+q 02   4c(k   1) +q 02   4c(k) = 1
where
 
0
2   4c(i)  0 for i 2 f0; ::; kg
However, there does not exist a solution to:ej2   ei2 = 4(c(i)  c(j)) for i; j 2 f0; ::; k + 1g
ei  0 for i 2 f0; ::; kge0 + e1 + :::+ ek+1 = 1.
which we can rewrite as:
e0 +re02   4c(1) + :::+re02   4c(k) +re02   4c(k + 1) = 1
where
e02   4c(i)  0 for i 2 f0; ::; k + 1g
Therefore, if a strategy pair involving mk is NITS-feasible and maximal, it must be that:
4c(k + 1) >
 
0
2  4c(k) (8)
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We need to check that it is not protable for the sender at s = 0, to transmit a message more
costly than mk. By Lemma 8, the equilibrium payo¤s for the S who received signal s = 0 is:
 

0
2
  0
2
  c(0) =  

1
2
  0
2
  c(1) = ::: =  
 
k
2
  0
!2
  c(k).
All of the messages used in equilibrium will not provide a protable deviation, therefore we
must use an out-of-equilibrium message to nd a deviation. Any deviation accomplished by
message mk+x where x > 1 can be accomplished by sending message mk+1. Therefore, the
least costly (and therefore best candidate) out-of-equilibruim message is the message mk+1.
If such a message is sent, R would have beliefs that the message was sent by state s = 0.
Sending this message yields a payo¤ of  c(k + 1). Therefore, the signal will be protable
when:
 c(k + 1)   

0
2
  0
2
which we rewrite as:  
0
2  4c(k + 1): (9)
However, we have arrived at a contradiction as it cannot be the case that both (8) and (9) can
hold. Therefore, there does not exist a deviation from the maximal, NITS-feasible strategy
pair where mk is the most costly message.
Now we will show that if b = 0 and there is an equilibrium with a most costly message
mk then NITS does not admit an equilibrium with a cheaper most costly message. For the
case of k > 0, suppose that a strategy pair with a most costly message mk is NITS-feasible
and a strategy pair with a most costly message mk+1 is not17, and so expression (8) holds.
Consider a candidate strategy pair involving a most costly message of mk
0
where k0 < k. This
candidate equilibrium is characterized by:
bj2   bi2 = 4(c(i)  c(j)) for i; j 2 f0; ::; k0g
bk0 > 0b0 + b1 + :::+ bk0 = 1.
Each of the intervals in the candidate equilibrium are larger than their corresponding intervals
in the original equilibrium. Namely that bi > i for i 2 f0; :::; k0g. To see this, note that the
di¤erence between the size of the intervals on which messages mi for i 2 f0; :::; k0g are sent are
identical in the original and candidate equilibria. However, for the original equilibria there
are additional intervals to accommodate and so each of the intervals in the original equilibria
must be smaller than their counterpart in the candidate equilibrium. Therefore
bi > i  4c(k).
17For the case that k = 0, then there is no possible equilibria in which a less costly signal is used.
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So we can write the equilibrium payo¤s as:
US =  
0B@
b02
2
  0
1CA
2
<  c(k).
Deviation payo¤s are  c(k), therefore equilibrium payo¤s are less than deviation payo¤s and
so an equilibrium involving a most costly message of mk
0
cannot exist where there exists an
equilibrium with a most costly message of mk.
To see that each NITS-feasible strategy pair involving a most costly message mk uniquely
determines the values of , we can rewrite expression (3) as:q
4c(k) +
 
k
2
+
q
4[c(k)  c(1)] +  k2 +q4[c(k)  c(2)] +  k2 + ::: (10)
+
q
4[c(k)  c(k   2)] +  k2 +q4[c(k)  c(k   1)] +  k2 + k = 1.
The left hand side of expression (10) is strictly increasing in k and therefore must only hold
for a single value of k. And so the proposition is proved.
10.2 Numerical Examples
In the interest in keeping the examples as simple as possible, we restrict attention to the case
of perfect alignment of preferences (b = 0) and a linear cost function. We now provide an
example of the set of equilibria without a renement of the out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
Example 3 Consider the case where c(i) = 0:01i and b = 0. First, by Lemma 2 there is an
equilibrium where m0 is sent on all states. Next, we consider the set of equilibria in which two
messages are sent. By Lemma 2, one of the messages must be the least costly message, m0.
For instance, there is an equilibrium where where m0 is sent on states [0; 0:52) and m1 on
states [0:52; 1]. There is another such equilibrium where m1 is sent on states [0; 0:48) and m0
on states [0:48; 1]. Note that in both of these equilibria 0 = 0:52 and 1 = 0:48. There are
also 2 equilibria involving m0 and m2 where 0 = 0:54 and 2 = 0:46. Additionally, there are
2 equilibria involving m0 and m3 where 0 = 0:56 and 3 = 0:44. In fact, this continues in
this fashion for m1 through m24. In other words, there are equilibria involving two messages
m0 and mk1 where k1 2 f1; ::; 24g. Next, we consider the case where there are three messages
sent in equilibrium. There are 6 equilibria involving m0, m1 and m2 where 0 = 0:392,
1 = 0:337, and 2 = 0:271. There also exist 6 equilibria involving m0, m1 and m3 where
0 = 0:413, 1 = 0:362, and 3 = 0:225. Likewise, there also exists 6 equilibria involving
m0, m2 and m3 where 0 = 0:427, 2 = 0:321, and 3 = 0:251. There also exists many
more equilibria in which 3 messages are sent. We now consider the case where 4 messages
are sent in equilibrium. For instance, there are 24 equilibria involving m0, m1, m2 and m3
where 0 = 0:363, 1 = 0:303, 2 = 0:227 and 3 = 0:107. There also exists 24 equilibria
involving m0, m2 , m3 and m4 where 0 = 0:408, 2 = 0:294, 3 = 0:216 and 4 = 0:082.
Correspondingly, there also exists more equilibria in which 4 messages are sent. There does
not exist an equilibrium in which 5 or more messages are sent.
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In contrast to the multiplicity of equilibria in Example 3, in the Example 4 we show that
NITS admits only the class of equilibria with the largest possible number of actions induced.
The example also illustrates the utility of Lemma 5 whereby we are able to easily identify that
the maximal, NITS-feasible strategy will involve 4 messages.
Example 4 Consider the case where c(i) = 0:01i and b = 0. Note that:
c(4) = 0:00662 < 0:01 < c(3) = 0:0145.
Therefore we can restrict attention to equilibria in which messages m0, m1, m2 and m3 are
used. There are no NITS-feasible strategy pairs (; ) for the case of more than four mes-
sages. There is a monotonic equilibrium where m0 is sent on states [0; 0:363), m1 on states
[0:363; 0:665), m2 on [0:665; 0:892) and m3 on [0:892; 1]. The remaining 23 equilibria require
that 0 = 0:363, 1 = 0:302, 2 = 0:227 and 3 = 0:108. Only the 24 equilibria which involve
m0, m1, m2 and m3, are admitted under NITS.
10.3 Example of non-existence of equilibrium under an alternate specica-
tion of NITS
Here we provide an example where there does not exist an equilibrium for an alternate, and
arguably more reasonable, specication of NITS. Recall that upon observing an out-of-
equilibrium message, the receiver believes that the state is s = 0. A common justication
for these beliefs is that s = 0 is the lowest state. However, in general that state does not
yield the lowest ex-ante payo¤s for the sender. Specically, the state s = 0 shares with other
the states the distinction of the smallest ex-ante payo¤s for the case of b = 0. However, this
is not true for the case of b > 0. When b > 0, the sender at state s = 1 has the lowest
ex-ante payo¤s, and this state would therefore seem to be the best candidate for beliefs upon
observing an out-of-equilibrium message. Although these beliefs appear to be reasonable, as
the following example shows, under these beliefs we are not guaranteed an equilibrium.
Example 5 Suppose that c = 0 and b = 0:2. Upon observing an out-of-equilibrium message,
we assume that the receiver believes that the state is s = 1. Consider the strategy pair (; )
in which one message is sent on all states. This induces an optimal action of R of a = 0:5.
The payo¤ of the sender at state s = 1 is  0:49, whereas the payo¤ to the sender at state s = 0
is  0:09. If the sender at state s = 1 transmits an out-of-equilibrium message then a payo¤
of  0:04 can be attained and so a protable deviation exists. Therefore, the uninformative
equilibrium cannot exist. Consider the strategy pair (; ) in which two messages are sent.
According to expression (4) one message is sent on states [0; 0; 1) and the other is sent on
states [0:1; 1]. The payo¤ of the sender at state s = 1, is  0:4225 and the payo¤ of the
sender at state s = 0 is  0:0225. If the sender at state s = 1 transmits an out-of-equilibrium
message then a payo¤ of  0:04 can be attained and so a protable deviation exists. Note
that in both the strategy pair in which one message is transmitted and the strategy pair in
which two messages are transmitted, the S at the state s = 1 obtains the smallest payo¤s,
and in this sense is an appropriate candidate for the origin of an out-of-equilibrium message.
On the other hand, there does not exist an equilibrium under this alternate specication of
NITS when either one or two messages are transmitted. Additionally, a strategy pair (; )
involving three messages cannot satisfy expressions (1), (3) and (4). Hence, there cannot
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exist an equilibrium with in which three or more messages are used. Therefore, there does not
exist an equilibrium under this alternate specication of NITS.
Although for b > 0 we are not guaranteed an equilibrium under this alternate specication
of NITS, we are guaranteed an equilibrium for the case of b = 0.
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